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INTRODUCTION
Legal doctrines are not created equal. Some doctrines are solid and
survive the test of time, some are short-lived, and others transform
and adapt in order to serve specific legal and political purposes. The
transformation can be radical (hence constituting a metamorphosis)
or can be a minor adaptation to new circumstances.
The doctrine of non-delegation is one that has transformed
radically over time. Since 1935, the courts interpreted the nondelegation doctrine as a de-facto delegation doctrine (hence so-called
dormant non-delegation) and have provided the constitutional
grounds for the expansion of the administrative state. 1 In its dormant
version, it constitutes the backbone for the doctrine of judicial
deference which has in turn evolved since its first 1984 Chevron
formulation and has expanded to Auer and Skidmore variants. 2
Moved by distrust in the growth of the administrative state,
conservative judges and legal scholars have recently attacked both
doctrines. 3 At the core of the debate is the constitutional legitimacy
of the administrative state and of the delegation of power from the
legislative branch to the executive branch. Professors Cass Sunstein
and Adrian Vermeule have named this attitude towards the
administrative state “The New Coke” and made a parallel between
*

1.

2.

3.

Dr. Ilaria Di Gioia is a Senior Lecturer in Law and Associate Director of the Centre
for American Legal Studies at Birmingham City University, UK.
Her research investigates the role of the courts in setting the balance between central
and local government and, more widely, the various ways in which constitutional law
interacts with the political process. She has published and presented research in the
U.S. and Europe on the federal aspects of the Affordable Care Act, the sanctuary
cities phenomenon and legalization of marijuana.
Besides academia, Dr. Di Gioia devotes her free time to public service in her capacity
of Honorary Vice-Consul for Italy in Birmingham, UK.
See Pan. Refin. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 420–21 (1935) (“[T]he necessity and
validity of [rulemaking] provisions and the wide range of administrative authority
which has developed by means of them cannot . . . obscure . . . the authority to
delegate, if our constitutional system is to be maintained.”).
See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)
(“[C]onsiderable weight should be accorded to an executive department’s
construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer . . . .”); Auer v.
Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461–63 (1997) (“[The Secretary of Labor] is free to write the
regulations as broadly as he wishes, subject only to the limits imposed by the
statute.”); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139–40 (1944) (“This Court has
long given considerable and in some cases decisive weight to [executive agency]
[d]ecisions and to interpretative regulations of the [agency.]”).
See Adrian Vermeule, Bureaucracy and Distrust: Landis, Jaffe, and Kagan on the
Administrative State, 130 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2463 (2017).
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the resistance to the executive prerogative of the English judge and
the current aversion to executive delegation of power. 4 Two years
ago, the Supreme Court considered a challenge to the dormant nondelegation doctrine in the Gundy case; 5 Justice Kagan’s plurality
opinion sheltered the doctrine from the attacks of Justice Gorsuch,
Justice Roberts, and Justice Thomas. 6 However, the fragmented
decision has prompted wide scholarly and media speculation on the
uncertain future of the doctrine. 7 President Biden’s climate agenda,
for instance, relies upon the creation of new regulations by agencies
such as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and new
regulations often face legal challenges. 8 If the doctrine is scrutinized
again by the Supreme Court, the conservative majority is expected to
be less supportive of delegation. 9 Justice Alito’s concurrence in
Gundy seemed to indicate that he would be prepared to resurrect the
non-delegation doctrine and he may be able to persuade his
conservative colleagues. 10 This means that the non-delegation
doctrine may soon go through a transformation, the extent of which
remains to be seen.
This Article engages with a review of the historical developments
surrounding the doctrine of non-delegation and how it has morphed
over time. It examines the theoretical link between the practice of
judicial deference and the dormant non-delegation doctrine and
argues that a change of jurisprudence around the non-delegation
doctrine would also have an inevitable impact on the jurisprudence
around judicial deference. If courts could strike regulations that they
deem involve improperly delegated powers, then they may be keener
on interpreting statutes and regulations that would otherwise be
deferred to agencies’ interpretation.

4.
5.
6.
7.

8.
9.
10.

CASS R. SUNSTEIN & ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW & LEVIATHAN: REDEEMING THE
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 19 (2020).
Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2121 (2019).
Id.
Wayne A. Logan, Gundy v. United States: Gunning for the Administrative State, 17
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 185, 186 (2019); Hannah Mullen & Sejal Singh, The Supreme
Court Wants to Revive a Doctrine That Would Paralyze Biden’s Administration,
SLATE
(Dec.
1,
2020,
12:56
PM),
https://slate.com/news-andpolitics/2020/12/supreme-court-gundy-doctrine-administrative-state.html
[https://perma.cc/HP4B-9XJM].
See Mullen & Singh, supra note 7.
Id.
Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2130–31 (Alito, J., concurring).
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Part I reconstructs the history of the non-delegation doctrine and, in
particular, argues that it has evolved into a de-facto delegation
doctrine. 11
Part II discusses the seminal cases of Chevron and Mead and
identifies the latter as the theoretical connecting ring between the
delegation doctrine and judicial deference. 12
Part III considers deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own
ambiguous regulations and discusses the call for a revision of Auer. 13
Part IV continues the discussion on agencies’ interpretation of their
own ambiguous regulations with particular reference to the Kisor
case. 14
Part V discusses the latest challenge to the dormant delegation
doctrine in the Gundy case. 15
I.

FROM “NON-DELEGATION” TO “DORMANT NONDELEGATION” DOCTRINE

The American Constitution attributes the legislative power to
Congress (Article I), the executive power to the President (Article II),
and the “judicial power” to the courts (Article III), but it is silent on
agency powers. 16 The provisions related to the executive power
mainly concern the President and officers commissioned by the
President. 17 Such an omission sits uncomfortably with the recent
growth of the administrative state and the consequent increase of the
power of agencies that constitute, according to some, a fourth branch
of government. 18 It is a fact that administrative agencies have
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

See discussion infra Part I.
See discussion infra Part II.
See discussion infra Part III.
See discussion infra Part IV.
See discussion infra Part V.
See U.S. CONST. art. I; id. art. II; id. art. III.
Id. art II, § 3.
Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the
Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 574–78 (1984). For an early reflection on the
role of agencies, see Justice Jackson’s dissenting opinion in FTC v. Ruberoid Co.:
The rise of administrative bodies probably has been the most
significant legal trend of the last century and perhaps more values
today are affected by their decisions than by those of all the
courts, review of administrative decisions apart. They also have
begun to have important consequences on personal rights. Cf.
United States v. Spector, 343 U.S. 169 (1952). They have become
a veritable fourth branch of the Government, which has deranged
our three-branch legal theories much as the concept of a fourth
dimension unsettles our three-dimensional thinking.
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executive, legislative, and judicial functions. They perform executive
functions through agency enforcement, legislative functions through
rulemaking, and judicial functions through administrative hearings
and judicial deference. 19 Even though their role had not been
explicitly acknowledged in the text of the Constitution,
administrative agencies de facto perform the functions above on
delegation of Congress. 20
Hence, a question is in order: how have the courts justified the
delegation of legislative, executive, and interpretive power to
administrative agencies? The answer is controversial and resides in
the modern recognition of the impracticability of a strict application
of the traditional non-delegation doctrine. This is the legal doctrine
according to which Congress, vested with “[a]ll legislative powers”
by Article I of the Constitution, cannot delegate these powers to
another branch. 21
With the growth of the administrative state, the courts started to
take distance from the traditional understanding of the principle of
separation of powers and recognized that overlaps and delegations
were necessary for the functioning of the modern state. A first
acknowledgment of the ability of Congress to delegate regulatory
powers was made in 1911 when the Supreme Court held that
Congress may delegate authority in the form of “power to fill up the
details” under general provisions of law “by the establishment of
administrative rules and regulations[.]” 22 However, the Court first

19.
20.
21.

22.

343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (internal parallel citation omitted,
date added).
Strauss, supra note 18, at 577–79.
DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 122 (2010) (stating that “[t]he New
Deal is famous for having greatly increased the number of . . . agencies” that
combined “executive, legislative, and judicial functions”).
See U.S. CONST. art. I. Notably, the non-delegation doctrine finds deep roots in John
Locke’s social contract theory: “[t]he power of the legislative, being derived from the
people by a positive voluntary grant . . . can be no other than what the positive grant
conveyed, which being only to make laws, and not to make legislators[.]” JOHN
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 193 (Thomas I. Cook, ed., Hafner Publ’g
Co. 1947) (1690). The Supreme Court discussed this principle in numerous instances.
See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371 (1989) (“The nondelegation doctrine
is rooted in the principle of separation of powers . . . .”); see also Marshall Field &
Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892) (“That congress cannot delegate legislative
power to the president is a principle universally recognized as vital to the integrity and
maintenance of the system of government ordained by the constitution.”).
United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 517 (1911) (“From the beginning of the
government, various acts have been passed conferring upon executive officers power
to make rules and regulations . . . . None of these statutes could confer legislative
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directly upheld a congressional delegation of legislative power to the
executive (in the form of fixing customs duties on imported
merchandise) in 1928. 23 In the decision, Chief Justice Taft specified
that an agency’s legislative action is not forbidden if it is guided by
“an intelligible principle” laid down by the legislative act. 24 He
explained that such a delegation was possible because what was
being delegated was not legislative discretion but rather the ability
“to enforce [a congressional declaration] by regulation equivalent to
law.” 25 The focal point of the decision is the formulation of the
“intelligible principle” test that the Supreme Court has used, since
then, to determine the constitutionality of congressional
delegations. 26
Further scrutiny on the doctrine—and indeed use of the intelligible
principle test—took place in 1935 when, despite striking down
certain provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA)
that delegated to the President the authority to promulgate regulations
to stabilize the economy, Chief Justice Hughes recognized that the
Constitution was to be interpreted as granting Congress “flexibility
and practicality” and that therefore Congress could “leave[] to
selected instrumentalities the making of subordinate rules within
prescribed limits and the determination of facts to which the policy as
declared by the Legislature is to apply.” 27 Chief Justice Hughes
confirmed his belief in the delegation principle again in the Shechter

23.

24.

25.

26.
27.

power. But when Congress had legislated and indicated its will, it could give to those
who were to act under such general provisions ‘power to fill up the details’ by the
establishment of administrative rules and regulations . . . .”).
See J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 410–11 (1928)
(“[W]hile Congress could not delegate legislative power to the President, [fixing tariff
rates on imported goods] did not in any real sense invest the President with the power
of legislation, because nothing involving the expediency or just operation of such
legislation was left to . . . the President . . . . What the President was required to do
was merely in execution of the act of Congress. It was not the making of law.”).
Id. at 409 (So long as “Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible
principle to which the person or body authorized to [exercise the delegated authority]
is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of
legislative power.”). “Concepts of control and accountability” help define an
“intelligible principle.” Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Connally,
337 F. Supp. 737, 746 (D.D.C. 1971).
J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co., 276 U.S. at 408–09 (“They have not delegated to the
commission any authority or discretion as to what the law shall be-which would not
be allowable-but have merely conferred upon it an authority and discretion, to be
exercised in the execution of the law, and under and in pursuance of it, which is
entirely permissible.”).
Id. at 409.
Pan. Refin. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421, 433 (1935).
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Poultry case but eventually struck down the regulations of the poultry
industry put forward by President Roosevelt for other reasons (as an
invalid use of Congress’ commerce power). 28 The line of cases that
struck down congressional use and delegation of police powers
culminates with Carter v. Carter Coal, a case similar to the previous
two which determined that Congress’ legislation and delegation of
regulatory power regarding coal production was unconstitutional
under the commerce clause. 29 At this point it should be emphasized
that despite the negative outcomes, the above decisions paved the
way to the development and further elaboration of the delegation
doctrine. Since the New Deal, Professor Sandra Zellmer argued, “the
[non-delegation doctrine] has been, for all practical purposes, a dead
letter.” 30 In fact, since the Carter decision in 1936 the Supreme Court
has employed a more liberal approach to delegation of legislative
power and to some extent explicitly disregarded the non-delegation
doctrine. For example, in the 1941 decision Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v.
Administrator, the Supreme Court approved the congressional
delegation of the power to prescribe the minimum wage in an
industry to an administrator (up to a certain threshold). 31 In the
majority opinion, Justice Stone argued:
In an increasingly complex society Congress obviously
could not perform its functions if it were obliged to find all
the facts subsidiary to the basic conclusions which support
the defined legislative policy . . . . The essentials of the
legislative function are the determination of the legislative
policy and its formulation as a rule of conduct. Those
essentials are preserved when Congress specifies the basic
conclusions of fact upon ascertainment of which, from
relevant data by a designated administrative agency, it
ordains that its statutory command is to be effective. 32
The Court continued to apply the doctrine in several areas, such as:
the delegation to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to
regulate broadcast licensing as “public interest, convenience, or
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 530, 550–51 (1935).
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936).
Sandra B. Zellmer, The Devil, the Details, and the Dawn of the 21st Century
Administrative State: Beyond the New Deal, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 941, 943 (2000).
Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Adm’r of Wage & Hour Div. of Dep’t of Lab., 312 U.S.
126, 146 (1941).
Id. at 145.
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necessity”; 33 the delegation to the Price Administrator to fix
commodity prices as per the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942;34
the delegation to the Federal Power Commission to determine just
and reasonable rates; 35 the delegation of authority to determine
excessive profits; 36 the delegation of authority to the Sentencing
Commission to issue binding sentencing guidelines; 37 and, more
recently, the delegation of authority to the EPA to issue rules
pursuant to the Clean Air Act (CAA). 38 Not least, the delegation
doctrine had been further strengthened by the enactment of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in 1946, which conferred a
large degree of authority upon the executive and sanctioned
Congress’s ability to hand over to a given agency official the
authority to make policy decisions. 39
This Article argues that as a result of this development, the nondelegation doctrine has been weakened to the point of becoming
dormant. This dormancy provided the theoretical foundation for the
development of the administrative state and for the practice of
judicial deference, intended here as the delegation of interpretive
power to agencies over statutes and regulations that they administer.
The assumption is that if Congress is allowed to delegate lawmaking
authority to administrative agencies by providing guidance in the
form of intelligible principles, then Congress can also delegate
interpretive power over ambiguous statutes administered by the

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

38.

39.

Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 227 (1943).
Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 426 (1944).
Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 600–01 (1944).
Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 753 (1948).
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 374 (1989) (“In light of our approval of
these broad delegations, we harbor no doubt that Congress’ delegation of authority to
the Sentencing Commission is sufficiently specific and detailed to meet constitutional
requirements.”).
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 486 (2001). Other examples of
Supreme Court decisions in favor of the principle of delegation are: United States v.
Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 274 (1967) (“The Constitution has never been regarded as
denying to the Congress the necessary resources of flexibility and practicality . . . to
perform its function . . . .” (quoting Pan. Refin. Co. v. Ryan 293 U.S. 388, 421
(1935))); Nat’l Cable Television Ass’n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 337 (1974)
(establishing that federal agencies can impose fair and equitable fees for services
rendered).
See Roni A. Elias, The Legislative History of the Administrative Procedure Act, 27
FORDHAM ENV’T L. REV. 207, 207–08 (2016); see generally Administrative Procedure
Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59 (2018) (outlining the procedures administrative agencies
must follow to exercise their rulemaking authority within Congressional limits).
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agencies (Chevron deference) 40 or the agencies’ own regulations
(Auer deference). 41 As explained by Professor Jon D. Michaels,
“[t]he seminal Chevron and Mead cases can themselves be explained
through the lens of an enduring, evolving separation-of-powers
jurisprudence. Though not constitutional cases per se, both deal with
constitutional actors ceding power to a rival.” 42
The next section discusses the doctrine of judicial deference as
developed by the courts.
II. CHEVRON AND MEAD: DEFERENCE TO
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES’ INTERPRETATION OF
STATUTES
Chevron is the seminal case concerning judicial deference in the
United States. 43 The 1984 Supreme Court decision is now the most
cited case in federal administrative law. 44
The case involved a regulation of the EPA that defined “stationary
source” under the nonattainment provisions of the CAA as an entire
plant rather than a single pollution-emitting unit within the plant.45
The issue concerned whether the courts should defer to the EPA’s
interpretation of the term stationary source. 46 The answer was that
deference to the agency interpretation is due, so long as it is
permissible as a reasonable interpretation. 47 The Supreme Court
hence created a rule for judicial deference, the Chevron rule, which
provides that if the meaning of the statutory term is ambiguous, the
courts should defer to a “permissible construction” of the term made
by the agency that administers the program. 48 According to the
Court, “[i]f Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill,
there is an expressed delegation of authority to the agency to
elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation.” 49 In other
words, the Court suggested that the theoretical basis for judicial
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

See Christopher J. Walker, Attacking Auer and Chevron Deference: A Literature
Review, 16 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 103–04, 110 (2018).
Id. at 105.
Jon D. Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving Separation of Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV.
515, 565 (2015).
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
See Thomas W. Merrill, Justice Stevens and the Chevron Puzzle, 106 NW. UNIV. L.
REV. 551, 552–53 (2012).
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 839.
Id. at 840.
Id. at 843.
Id. at 842–43.
Id. at 843–44.

164

UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

deference is the assumption that when Congress delegates
implementation to an agency, it also implicitly delegates interpretive
authority—including the authority to make policy decisions. Justice
Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court explaining judicial
deference as a two-step process. The first step involves an assessment
as to whether Congress has already spoken to the precise question at
issue. 50 The second step—reached only if Congress did not speak
clearly on the issue—is to question whether the administrative
agency’s interpretation is reasonable. 51 In the words of Justice
Stevens:
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute
which it administers, it is confronted with two questions.
First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly
spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of
Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court,
as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however,
the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the
precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose
its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in
the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the
statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific
issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's
answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute. 52
He then added, “[s]ometimes the legislative delegation to an agency
on a particular question is implicit rather than explicit. In such a case,
a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory
provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of
an agency.” 53 The decision was revolutionary because it created a
broad rule for shifting the responsibility of statutory construction
from the courts to the administrative agencies. Such a revolution has
been endorsed by prominent scholars such as Professor Merrill 54 and
Professor Cass Sustein. 55
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 839, 842.
Id. at 843–44.
Id. at 842–43.
Id. at 844.
Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 836
(2001).
See Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
2071, 2086 (1990).
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During a Yale Law School Symposium on the Executive power,
Professor Sunstein argued that “constitutional ambiguities should be
resolved by those who are most accountable[,]” 56 referring to the
executive branch. He based his argument on the assumption that
interpretation is policymaking and therefore a prerogative of the
executive, stating, “[f]or the resolution of ambiguities in statutory
law, technical expertise and political accountability are highly
relevant, and on these counts the executive has significant advantages
over courts.” 57
In the aftermath of the decision, then Judge Breyer and Justice
Scalia, commented on Chevron respectively in a First Circuit
decision 58 and in the Duke Law Journal. 59 Both justices seemed to
agree that Congress can implicitly delegate the power to interpret the
law to administrative agencies, but their approach differed on the
scope of such deference. 60 More specifically, Justice Breyer seemed
to believe that deference should be accorded only when technical and
narrow questions arise—i.e., questions that only agency experts are
able to answer. 61 When it comes to major policy issues, Justice
Breyer argues the courts should take responsibility for the
interpretation and avoid deference. 62 His position was explicitly
explained in his First Circuit decision Mayburg:
The less important the question of law, the more interstitial
its character, the more closely related to the everyday
administration of the statute and to the agency's (rather than
the court's) administrative or substantive expertise, the less
likely it is that Congress (would have) “wished” or
“expected” the courts to remain indifferent to the agency's
views. Conversely, the larger the question, the more its
answer is likely to clarify or stabilize a broad area of law,
the more likely Congress intended the courts to decide the
question themselves. 63

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power to Say What the Law Is,
115 YALE L.J. 2580, 2582–84 (2006).
Id. at 2583.
Mayburg v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 740 F.2d 100, 106 (1st Cir. 1984).
Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989
DUKE L.J. 511 (1989).
See Mayburg, 740 F.2d at 106; Scalia, supra note 59, at 512, 516–17.
Mayburg, 740 F.2d at 106.
Id.
Id. (citations omitted).
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In other words, Justice Breyer suggested that the courts should tailor
their approach to the different issues under review. Such position was
later clarified by Justice Breyer in his Administrative Law Review
article that proposes a distinction between judicial review of
questions of law and policy:
[T]here are too many different types of circumstances,
including different statutes, different kinds of application,
different substantive regulatory or administrative problems,
and different legal postures in which cases arrive. . . .
To read Chevron as laying down a blanket rule, applicable
to all agency interpretations of law, such as “always defer to
the agency when the statute is silent,” would be seriously
overbroad, counterproductive and sometimes senseless. 64
Justice Scalia was in favor of a blanket approach that encompasses
all types of judicial review issues and believed that deference should
be accorded without distinction:
Chevron is unquestionably better than what preceded it.
Congress now knows that the ambiguities it creates, whether
intentionally or unintentionally, will be resolved, within the
bounds of permissible interpretation, not by the courts but
by a particular agency, whose policy biases will ordinarily
be known. 65
The disagreement between Breyer and Scalia, as to whether there
should be different levels of deference for different types of
interpretation, shaped the broader debate as to what should be the
“Chevron domain.” 66 For example, do interpretive rules, such as
agency opinion letters or general statements of interpretation and
policy, deserve the same level of deference afforded to legislative
rules (issued via the formal notice-and-comment rulemaking)? 67
The Supreme Court addressed this question in Christensen v.
Harris County and established that opinion letters do not receive
Chevron deference but are instead persuasive and should receive a
64.
65.
66.
67.

Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV.
363, 373 (1986).
Scalia, supra note 59, at 517.
See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 54, at 835.
The lower courts issued contradictory rulings on letters. In Owsley v. San Antonio
Indep. Sch. Dist., 187 F.3d 521, 525 (5th Cir. 1999), a court denied deference to an
opinion letter whereas a different court granted deference in Herman v. Nationsbank
Tr. Co., 126 F.3d 1354, 1363 (11th Cir. 1997).
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less deferential standard of deference, the so-called Skidmore
deference. 68 If a court concludes that Chevron or Auer deference
cannot be applied because an agency’s construction of a statute that it
administers lacks the force of law or a regulation is not eligible for
rationality review, the court should generally apply the framework of
Skidmore deference. 69
As Professors Aziz Z. Huq and Jon D. Michaels argued, the
Supreme Court’s approach to the Constitution’s separation of powers
is a puzzle; there is no unitary approach but a cyclical approach to the
doctrine as a rule or a standard. 70 They referred to the different
approaches that the Court took in Skidmore and Chevron. In
Skidmore, judicial deference was interpreted as “respect” that the
courts owe to the rulings, interpretations, and opinions of the
agencies; a respect that it is not controlling over the opinion of the
courts but can be used for guidance. 71 Skidmore, they note, hence
constituted a standard because the emphasis was on “pragmatic
considerations to measure the deference owed to agency
interpretations,” 72 and Chevron constituted a rule because “the
interpretive deference given to agencies no longer depended on a
searching, case-specific analysis. Instead, only one fact mattered:
whether the relevant statute is ambiguous. If so, agencies are
automatically entitled to deference.” 73
The different extent to which courts should accord Chevron
deference was elaborated further by Justice Souter (joined by
Rehnquist, C.J., Stevens, O’ Connor, Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg,
and Breyer) in United States v. Mead Corp. 74 The issue at stake was
whether ruling letters issued by the United States Customs Service to
68.
69.
70.
71.

72.
73.
74.

Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000).
See id. at 587–88.
Aziz Z. Huq & Jon D. Michaels, The Cycles of Separation-of-Powers Jurisprudence,
126 YALE L.J. 346, 349, 351 (2016).
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (“We consider that the rulings,
interpretations and opinions of the Administrator under this Act, while not controlling
upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and
informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.
The weight of such a judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness
evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier
and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if
lacking power to control.”).
Huq & Michaels, supra note 70, at 365.
Id.
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001) (holding that when
agencies acted with the “force of law,” the Court should accord them Chevron
deference).
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classify and fix the rate of duty on imports should be accorded
judicial deference. 75 Justice Souter clarified that Chevron is typically
applied to agency regulations that hold the “force of law,” that is,
those regulations that have been preceded by the notice and comment
under the APA. 76 The ruling letters did not fall under this definition
and could only be accorded Skidmore deference. 77 Justice Scalia
dissented and manifested opposition to the concept of different types
of deference. 78 In his opinion, if the interpretation in question is
“authoritative” and “represents the official position of the agency” it
should be accorded deference. 79
A more in-depth discussion of what counts as authoritative
regulation is conducted below in conjunction with the analysis of the
Kisor and Perez decision. 80 For now, it is sufficient to acknowledge
that Justice Souter took the opportunity to clarify the different scopes
of Chevron and Skidmore deference and to point out that the variety
of regulations and measures enacted by the agencies deserved
different levels of deference. 81
More important for the purpose of examining the theoretical
foundation of deference is that the decision added a step zero to the
two steps devised by Chevron. According to Mead, before
proceeding to step one, a court must inquire whether there was
congressional intent to delegate to the agency so as to establish that
“Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules
carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming
deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.” 82
By creating a step zero, Mead formally recognized that when
Congress delegates the authority to implement a particular provision,
it may also choose to delegate interpretive authority on the same
provision. 83 In the words of the then Harvard Professor Elena Kagan,
75.
76.

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 221.
Id. (“We agree that a tariff classification has no claim to judicial deference under
Chevron, there being no indication that Congress intended such a ruling to carry the
force of law, but we hold that under Skidmore, the ruling is eligible to claim respect
according to its persuasiveness.”) (citations omitted). But see id. at 230–31 (noting
that notice-and-comment regulations are the most popular indication a regulation
carries the “force of law” but an absence of a notice-and-comment period is not
decisive if delegated authority can be shown in another form).
Id. at 221.
Id. at 250 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 256–57.
See infra Part IV.
Mead, 533 U.S. at 236–38.
Id. at 226–27.
Id. at 226–27, 231–34; see also id. at 245–46 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Mead represented “the apotheosis of a developing trend in Chevron
cases” that treated Chevron “as a congressional choice, rather than
either a constitutional mandate or a judicial doctrine.” 84 Mead
clarified that Chevron is based on congressional intent and that such
intent does not need to be explicit:
Congress, that is, may not have expressly delegated
authority or responsibility to implement a particular
provision or fill a particular gap. Yet it can still be apparent
from the agency’s generally conferred authority and other
statutory circumstances that Congress would expect the
agency to be able to speak with the force of law when it
addresses ambiguity in the statute or fills a space in the
enacted law, even one about which “Congress did not
actually have an intent” as to a particular result. 85
Judicial deference is, according to Mead and its progeny, “a judicial
construction” or a “fictionalized statement of legislative desire” that
nonetheless reflects the needs of the contemporary administrative
state. 86 If Chevron constituted a pillar of administrative law, the
Mead development makes it a seminal constitutional law case with
deep roots in theoretical constitutional discourse.
It is not surprising that, for its relevance in U.S. constitutional
dynamics, it has been at the center of heated debates on the proper
allocation of interpretive power and defined by Professor Sunstein as
“a kind of counter-Marbury for the administrative state” 87 and “the
administrative state’s very own McCulloch v. Maryland.” 88 The
parallel with Marbury highlights Professor Sunstein’s belief that the
interpretation of statutory provisions should be a prerogative of
government, not the court nor the legislative branch. 89 This is
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT.
REV. 201, 212 (2001).
Mead, 533 U.S. at 229 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 845 (1984)).
Barron & Kagan, supra note 84, at 212.
Sunstein, supra note 56, at 2589.
Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 190 (2006).
Prof. Sunstein stated:
My major goal in this Essay is to vindicate the law-interpreting
authority of the executive branch. This authority, I suggest, is
indispensable to the healthy operation of modern government; it
can be defended on both democratic and technocratic grounds. . . .
For the resolution of ambiguities in statutory law, technical
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because, in his opinion, interpretation constitutes policymaking: “If
we believe that the interpretation of ambiguous constitutional
provisions calls for judgments of policy and that democratic
institutions are in a particularly good position to make those
judgments, then Marbury is indeed vulnerable.” 90
Mead represents the explanation of the theoretical foundation of
judicial deference and this Article argues that “step zero” is the
connecting ring between the non-delegation doctrine and judicial
deference.
This theoretical assumption has not been free of criticism both
from academic circles and court benches. Chevron has been subject
to criticism and controversies over what commentators called the
“legal fiction” at the basis of the decision, referring to the
presumption that Congress could constitutionally delegate legislative
powers to regulatory agencies controlled by the President. 91
One of the scholarly arguments against Chevron and Mead is that
the doctrine is not consistent with Section 706 of the APA which
establishes that courts are tasked with the review of agency action
and they “shall . . . interpret . . . statutory provisions.” 92 The
argument is that the APA does not assign any role in statutory
interpretation to agencies 93 and is therefore to be interpreted as an
instruction to courts to use traditional canons of interpretation. 94

expertise and political accountability are highly relevant, and on
these counts the executive has significant advantages over courts.
Changed circumstances, involving new values and new
understandings of fact, are relevant too, and they suggest further
advantages on the part of the executive.
90.
91.
92.

93.

Sunstein, supra note 56, at 2582–83.
Id. at 2584.
The controversy is mainly related to the scope of legislative power of Congress as
established by Article I of the Constitution. Id. at 2590, 2607; see generally U.S.
CONST. art. I.
5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012) (“To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the
reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an
agency action.”).
See Patrick J. Smith, Chevron’s Conflict with the Administrative Procedure Act, 32
VA. TAX REV. 813, 814 (2013). Smith states:
It is impossible to reconcile the requirement in section 706 of the
APA that “the reviewing court shall . . . interpret . . . statutory
provisions” with Chevron’s holding that, under step two, a
reviewing court must accept an agency’s “permissible
construction of the statute” even if the agency interpretation is not
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On the constitutional side of the dispute, scholars and judges alike
have criticized Chevron and Mead for incompatibility with Article I
and Article III of the U.S. Constitution. Justice Thomas expressed
discomfort with deference to agencies in Michigan v. EPA, where he
argued that Chevron delegation “is in tension with Article III's
Vesting Clause, which vests the judicial power exclusively in Article
III courts, not administrative agencies[,]” and in tension with Article I
“which vests ‘[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted’ in Congress[,]”
thus advancing the case for revision of the doctrine. 95
Another fierce critic of the delegation doctrine and its
consequences on judicial deference is Justice Gorsuch who, during
his tenure as an Appeallate Judge, asserted that the doctrine is not
only “seemingly at odds with the separation of legislative and
executive functions,” but also creates concerns related to due process
(fair notice) and equal protection that magistrates normally
“muster.” 96 Justice Gorsuch borrowed this argument from the work
of Philip Hamburger, Professor of Law at Columbia Law School,
who depicted Chevron as an impermissible systematic bias of the
Fifth Amendment right to due process in favor of the government. 97
In particular, he argued that when courts defer to administrative
interpretation, they implicitly favor executive and other governmental
interpretations over the interpretations of other parties. 98
III. SEMINOLE/AUER: DEFERENCE TO AN AGENCY’S
INTERPRETATION OF ITS OWN AMBIGUOUS
REGULATIONS
A second type of judicial deference concerns agencies’ ambiguous
regulations. The principle that federal courts must defer to a
reasonable construction of an agency’s own ambiguous rules dates
back to 1945, when the Supreme Court examined wartime price
“the reading the court would have reached if the question initially
had arisen in a judicial proceeding.”

94.

95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 818; see also John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review,
77 TEX. L. REV. 113, 193–99 (1998).
See Aditya Bamzai, The Origins of Judicial Deference to Executive Interpretation,
126 YALE L.J. 908, 976–77 (2017) (“[S]ection 706 is best interpreted as an attempt to
. . . instruct courts to review legal questions using independent judgment and the
canons of construction.”).
Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743, 762 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring).
Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1152, 1154 (10th Cir. 2016).
See Philip Hamburger, Chevron Bias, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1187, 1212 (2016).
Id.
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control regulations implemented by the Administrator in Bowles v.
Seminole Rock & Sand Co. 99 In that instance, the Court decided that
the regulation was clear and did not need deference. 100 However, the
decision prescribed the use of judicial deference in future cases
concerning unclear regulations:
Since this [case] involves an interpretation of an
administrative regulation a court must necessarily look to
the administrative construction of the regulation if the
meaning of the words used is in doubt. The intention of
Congress or the principles of the Constitution in some
situations may be relevant in the first instance in choosing
between various constructions. But the ultimate criterion is
the administrative interpretation, which becomes of
controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulation. 101
The principle was then reaffirmed by Justice Antonin Scalia writing
for a unanimous court in Auer v. Robbins, a case concerning the
Secretary of Labor’s interpretation of its own regulations relating to
overtime pay enacted to implement the provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA) of 1938. 102 Specifically, the U.S. Department
of Labor applied a “salary-basis test” to determine that the petitioners
(sergeants and a lieutenant employed by the St. Louis Police
Department) fell under the exemption provided by § 213(a)(1) of the
FLSA for “bona fide executive, administrative, or professional”
employees and were not entitled to overtime pay. 103 The Supreme
Court deferred to the Secretary of Labor’s regulations and confirmed
that agencies’ interpretations of their own rules are controlling on the
court as long as they are “permissible.” 104 It did so by citing to
Chevron and justified this type of deference on the basis that
Congress has not “directly spoken to the precise question at issue,”105

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104

Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 413 (1945).
Id. at 419.
Id. at 413–14.
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 454–55 (1997).
Id. at 454, 461.
Id. at 457, 461 (citations omitted) (“Because the salary-basis test is a creature of the
Secretary’s own regulations, his interpretation of it is, under our jurisprudence,
controlling unless ‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.’ That
deferential standard is easily met here.”).
105. Id. at 457 (“Because Congress has not ‘directly spoken to the precise question at
issue,’ we must sustain the Secretary’s approach so long as it is ‘based on a
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and has therefore delegated both legislative and interpretive power to
the agency. 106 It should be noted that Auer deference does not
formally require a two-step process for review, but rather a singlelevel standard that makes it, according to its critics, broader and
bigger than Chevron. 107 More importantly, the fact that Auer does not
require a two-step process makes it more susceptible to challenges to
its constitutional foundations.
A major theoretical challenge to Auer—even before the case was
decided—was advanced by Professor John Manning, a textualist
scholar and Dean of Harvard Law School. Professor Manning argued
that the doctrine was at odds with the principle of separation of
powers and “contradict[ed] the constitutional premise that lawmaking
and law-exposition must be distinct.” 108 Similar criticism shortly
followed from the bench. As previously mentioned, Justice Scalia
had supported Chevron deference and authored the Auer decision
using the constitutional basis of Chevron. 109 However, towards the
end of his life, Justice Scalia changed his mind and joined Professor
Manning in the call for abandonment of the Auer doctrine in his
concurrence in Talk America, Inc. v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co.,110

106.

107.

108.
109.

110.

permissible construction of the statute.’” (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984))).
See Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Rev. Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 151 (1991)
(“[W]e presume that the power authoritatively to interpret its own regulations is a
component of the agency’s delegated lawmaking powers.”); Bruh v. Bessemer
Venture Partners III L.P., 464 F.3d 202, 208 (2d Cir. 2006).
See Jonathan H. Adler, Auer Evasions, 16 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 13–14 (2018)
(“Such broad deference can neither be justified under the umbrella of Chevron’s
domain, nor by appeal to the agency’s superior knowledge. Yet, in practice, the
deference agencies receive under Auer is as great—if not greater—than the deference
they receive under Chevron . . . .”).
John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency
Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 654 (1996).
Justice Scalia first elaborated a defense of a blanket approach to deference in his
dissent in Mead and then in his concurrence in Perez v. Mortgage Bankers: “[T]he
rule of Chevron, if it did not comport with the APA, at least was in conformity with
the long history of judicial review of executive action, where ‘[s]tatutory ambiguities .
. . were left to reasonable resolution by the Executive.’” Perez v. Mortg. Bankers
Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 111–12 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting United States v.
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 243 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S. 50, 68 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring).
Justice Scalia wrote:
It is comforting to know that I would reach the Court’s result even
without Auer. For while I have in the past uncritically accepted
that rule, I have become increasingly doubtful of its validity. On
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in his dissent in Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense
Center, 111 and in his concurrence in Perez v. Mortgage Bankers
Association. 112 The late Justice Scalia was particularly concerned
about the weak constitutional basis of Auer and argued that the
jurisprudence surrounding the doctrine did not provide a “persuasive
justification” for it. 113 He asserted that Auer, as opposed to Chevron,
could not be justified on congressional delegation grounds because
Congress could not constitutionally delegate the power to enact and
interpret regulations to the same entity:
While the implication of an agency power to clarify the
statute is reasonable enough, there is surely no
congressional implication that the agency can resolve
ambiguities in its own regulations. For that would violate a
fundamental principle of separation of powers—that the
power to write a law and the power to interpret it cannot rest
in the same hands. . . . Auer is not a logical corollary to
Chevron but a dangerous permission slip for the arrogation
the surface, it seems to be a natural corollary—indeed, an a
fortiori application—of the rule that we will defer to an agency’s
interpretation of the statute it is charged with implementing, see
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837 (1984). But it is not. When Congress enacts an
imprecise statute that it commits to the implementation of an
executive agency, it has no control over that implementation
(except, of course, through further, more precise, legislation). The
legislative and executive functions are not combined.
Id.
111. Decker v. Nw. Env’t Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 616–17 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (“Enough is enough. For decades, and for no good reason,
we have been giving agencies the authority to say what their rules mean, under the
harmless-sounding banner of ‘defer[ring] to an agency’s interpretation of its own
regulations.’. . . [R]espondent has asked us, if necessary, to ‘reconsider Auer.’ I
believe that it is time to do so.”).
112. See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 108–12 (2015) (Scalia, J.,
concurring). He argued:
I would therefore restore the balance originally struck by the
APA with respect to an agency’s interpretation of its own
regulations, not by rewriting the Act in order to make up for Auer,
but by abandoning Auer and applying the Act as written. The
agency is free to interpret its own regulations with or without
notice and comment; but courts will decide—with no deference to
the agency—whether that interpretation is correct.
Id. at 112.
113. See Decker, 568 U.S. at 617 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

2022]

A Tale of Transformation

175

of power. . . . He who writes a law must not adjudge its
violation. 114
IV. “POTENT IN ITS PLACE BUT CABINED IN ITS SCOPE”:
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF
DEFERENCE IN KISOR V. WILKIE (2019)
Despite fears and rumours that a majority of conservative justices
would have axed Auer, in June 2019 the Supreme Court confirmed its
constitutionality by a 5-4 majority in Kisor v. Wilkie. 115 Justice
Kagan authored the majority opinion and used this opportunity to
reiterate the standing of the doctrine and clarify the extent of Auer
domain, such as the circumstances in which a court should give
deference. 116 She started her opinion by highlighting that Auer, just
like Chevron, is grounded on the presumption of congressional
delegation, therefore confirming the unwillingness of the Court to
revisit such a consolidated presumption of delegation. 117 The
theoretical foundations of deference are safe for Justice Kagan; she
insisted that the Auer doctrine retains an important role in construing
agency regulations. 118 As expected, Justice Gorsuch argued in his
concurrence that because of the new limitations that Kisor imposes
on judicial deference, Auer has become “a paper tiger[,]” meaning
that it has lost its bite and efficacy. 119 What follows is a short
synopsis of the facts of the case, the decision, and an analysis of its
impact on the doctrine of deference in the United States.
The lawsuit involved a Marine veteran appealing the decision of
the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to refuse him the award of
retroactive disability benefits for his service-related post-traumatic
stress disorder (PTSD) because the evidence provided by the
claimant was, according to the VA’s interpretation of its regulations,
not “relevant.” 120 On appeal, the Federal Circuit Court found that
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 619–21.
Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019).
Id. at 2408.
Id. at 2412 (“We have explained Auer deference (as we now call it) as rooted in a
presumption about congressional intent—a presumption that Congress would
generally want the agency to play the primary role in resolving regulatory
ambiguities.”).
118. Id. at 2408.
119. Id. at 2425–26 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
120. 38 C.F.R. § 3.156 (2021) (“A claimant may reopen a finally adjudicated claim by
submitting new and material evidence. . . . Notwithstanding any other section in this
part, at any time after VA issues a decision on a claim, if VA receives or associates
with the claims file relevant official service department records that existed and had
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“uncertainty in application suggests that the regulation is
ambiguous[,]” and therefore applied Auer deference in affirming the
VA’s construction of the regulation and, as a consequence, the VA’s
denial of retroactive benefits. 121 The question before the Supreme
Court was whether Auer v. Robbins 122 and Bowles v. Seminole Rock
& Sand Co. 123 should be overruled. 124 The majority did not miss the
chance to defend Auer on the basis of stare decisis and on its
historical roots that go deeper than Seminole Rock and specifically go
back to United States v. Eaton, 125 a late nineteenth century decision
that attributed “the greatest weight” to the interpretation given to the
regulations by the department charged with their execution. 126
However, adherence to stare decisis is a minimal part of the
reasoning in the majority opinion. The heavy weight is in defence of
the theoretical foundations of judicial deference that Justice Kagan
carried out in the opinion. She recognized that the dormant nondelegation doctrine is only a theoretical presumption but also seemed
to support its usefulness for the purposes of interpretation. 127 In
Justice Kagan’s words:
We have adopted the presumption—though it is always
rebuttable—that “the power authoritatively to interpret its
own regulations is a component of the agency’s delegated
lawmaking powers.” Martin, 499 U.S. at 151, 111 S.Ct.
1171. . . . In part, that is because the agency that
promulgated a rule is in the “better position [to] reconstruct”
its original meaning. Id., at 152, 111 S.Ct. 1171. Consider
that if you don’t know what some text (say, a memo or an email) means, you would probably want to ask the person
who wrote it. And for the same reasons, we have thought,
Congress would too (though the person is here a collective
actor). 128

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

not been associated with the claims file when VA first decided the claim, VA will
reconsider the claim, notwithstanding paragraph (a) of this section.”).
Kisor v. Shulkin, 869 F.3d 1360, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2017), vacated, 139 S. Ct. 2400
(2019).
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945).
Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2408.
United States v. Eaton, 169 U.S. 331 (1898).
Id. at 343.
Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2412.
Id.
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Furthermore, she defended deference to agencies as convenient from
a policy point of view. 129 Agencies have the advantage of being the
presumed experts on their areas of competence and this is particularly
important when they are called to clarify interpretations of rules
concerning matters of scientific or technical nature such as an FDA
regulation that bans certain pharmaceutical products for their
components. 130 The point is that judges sometimes just cannot
embrace such technicalities.
Another advantage of agencies, according to Justice Kagan, is that
they have political accountability and are supervised by the President
who in turn reflects the latest policy choices of the electorate. 131 This
ensures that the provisions related to new policies can be
appropriately interpreted by the government that implemented them.
Finally, the interpretation of the agency will be consistent and will
avoid conflicting interpretations in the lower courts. 132
Kisor, this note argues, was also a case that consolidated previous
jurisprudence and clarified the circumstances in which the courts
should be deferring interpretation to the agencies. 133 This is, indeed,
the function that Justice Kagan wanted Kisor to play, stating that
“Auer deference is sometimes appropriate and sometimes not.
Whether to apply it depends on a range of considerations that we
have noted now and again, but compile and further develop
today.” 134 According to Justice Kagan, the doctrine remains “potent
in its place, but cabined in its scope.” 135 Cabined because, she
explains, the courts can defer interpretation only if the following
requirements are satisfied:
(A) the regulation is genuinely ambiguous; 136
(B) the agency’s reading is reasonable; 137
129. See id. at 2413.
130. See Actavis Elizabeth L.L.C. v. FDA, 625 F.3d 760, 764–66 (D.C. Cir. 2010). This
case concerned whether a company created a new “active moiety” by joining a
previously approved moiety to lysine through a non-ester covalent bond. See id. at
761–62.
131. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2413.
132. See generally id. at 2412–14 (providing background on the benefits of Auer deference
in administrative regulation interpretation).
133. See id. at 2415.
134. Id. at 2408.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 2414–15.
137. Id. at 2415–16.
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(C) the regulatory interpretation is authoritative, i.e., one actually
made by the agency; 138
(D) the agency’s interpretation is expertise based, i.e., in some
way it implicates the agency’s substantive expertise; 139 and,
(E) an agency’s reading of a rule in question reflects a “fair and
considered judgment[.]” 140
As to points A and B, these are well-established requirements and
they apply to Chevron deference more generally. 141 Chevron
specified that before according deference, the courts are required to
determine whether Congress has or has not directly addressed the
precise question at issue and only proceed to question whether the
agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute
if the statute is silent or ambiguous. 142
Point C is an attempt to consolidate jurisprudence around the
distinction between authoritative interpretations and non-binding
ones. 143 Justice Kagan pointed out that deference is only accorded to
authoritative interpretations. 144 The issue is particularly relevant with
regards to what Professor Bertrall Ross of Berkely School of Law
calls “the deference dichotomy” between interpretive rules and
legislative rules. 145
In Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association, a unanimous Court
established that when a federal administrative agency first issues a
rule interpreting one of its regulations, it is generally not required to
follow the notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures of the APA
(or Act). 146 As a consequence, Perez confirmed that interpretive rules
138. Id. at 2416 (“The interpretation must at the least emanate from those actors, using
those vehicles, understood to make authoritative policy in the relevant context.”).
139. Id. at 2417.
140. Id. at 2417 (quoting Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 155
(2012)).
141. Before concluding that a rule is genuinely ambiguous, a court must exhaust all the
“traditional tools” of construction. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984).
142. Id. at 843.
143. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2416.
144. See id.
145. Bertrall L. Ross II, Denying Deference: Civil Rights and Judicial Resistance to
Administrative Constitutionalism, 2014 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 223, 223–24.
146. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 96–97 (2015); Administrative Procedure
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (2018).
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do not have the force or effect of law. 147 On the other hand,
legislative rules, which impose obligations or produce other
significant effects on private interests, do require the notice-andcomment procedure. 148 Kisor confirmed the different procedural
requirements for interpretive rules and legislative rules.149
Furthermore, in an attempt to consolidate the jurisprudence around
authoritativeness of agency interpretations, the Court seemed to
respond to Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Perez regarding the role of
the courts. 150 In Perez, Justice Scalia stated that an agency can
interpret its regulations, but the courts have the final say in deciding
whether that interpretation is correct:
I would therefore restore the balance originally struck by the
APA with respect to an agency’s interpretation of its own
regulations, not by rewriting the Act in order to make up for
Auer, but by abandoning Auer and applying the Act as
written. The agency is free to interpret its own regulations
with or without notice and comment; but courts will
decide—with no deference to the agency—whether that
interpretation is correct. 151
In response to Scalia’s comments, Justice Kagan confirmed that
interpretive rules do not have the force of law but also clarified that
the meaning of legislative rules “remains in the hands of the courts”:
An interpretive rule itself never forms “the basis for an
enforcement action.”
....
[T]he meaning of a legislative rule remains in the hands of
courts, even if they sometimes divine that meaning by
looking to the agency’s interpretation. Courts first decide
whether the rule is clear; if it is not, whether the agency’s
reading falls within its zone of ambiguity; and even if the
reading does so, whether it should receive deference. In

147. Perez, 575 U.S. at 96–97.
148. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1987); White v.
Shalala, 7 F.3d 296, 303–04 (2d Cir. 1993).
149. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2420.
150. Compare id., with Perez, 575 U.S. at 109–10 (Scalia, J., concurring).
151. Perez, 575 U.S. at 112 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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short, courts retain the final authority to approve—or not—
the agency’s reading of a notice-and-comment rule. 152
As to point D, expertise of the agency is a foundational
requirement for Auer because, Justice Kagan explains, administrative
knowledge and experience largely “account [for] the presumption
that Congress delegates interpretive law-making power to the
agency.” 153 In other words, expertise is the reason why we assume
that Congress delegated interpretation; if the agency does not have
expertise there is no presumption of delegation.
Regarding point E, deference to “fair and considered judgement,”
courts are required to assess whether the agency interpretation is fair
and does not create “unfair surprise” to regulated parties. 154 Justice
Kagan explains: “We have therefore only rarely given Auer deference
to an agency construction ‘conflict[ing] with a prior one.’” 155
Kisor is certainly not the revolutionary decision that many were
expecting. 156 Instead, this author argues, it is an exercise in doctrine
transformation. The essence of judicial deference remains the same;
its scope has changed. Only time will tell whether this minor
transformation of the scope of the doctrine will stand future
challenges or whether a wider revolution around deference is coming.
V. THE LATEST CHALLENGE TO THE NON-DELEGATION
DOCTRINE: GUNDY V. UNITED STATES (2019)
In June 2019, the Supreme Court considered a non-delegation
challenge and, despite the Federalist Society’s rumors that the time
was ripe for a U-turn on the non-delegation doctrine, 157 the Court
confirmed that the post-1935 evolution of the non-delegation doctrine
into a dormant non-delegation doctrine was not to be reversed. 158 The
152. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2420 (citation omitted) (quoting Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. McCarthy,
758 F.3d 243, 251 (D.C. Cir. 2014)).
153. Id. at 2417 (quoting Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Rev. Comm’n, 499 U.S.
144, 153 (1991)).
154. Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 170–71 (2017).
155. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2418 (quoting Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504,
515 (1994)).
156. See, e.g., Catherine M. Sharkey, Cutting in on the Chevron Two-Step, 86 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2359, 2361–62 (2018) (suggesting that the Supreme Court was likely to diverge
from the kind of judicial deference to agencies embodied in Chevron because of
public statements made by newly-seated Justice Gorsuch).
157. See Matthew Cavedon & Jonathan Skrmetti, Party Like It’s 1935?: Gundy v. United
States and the Future of the Non-Delegation Doctrine, 19 FEDERALIST SOC’Y REV. 42,
52–53 (2018).
158. See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2130 (2019).
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case involved the constitutionality of 34 U.S.C. § 20913(d), a
provision of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act
(SORNA) that delegates power to the Attorney General “to specify
the applicability” of the registration requirements to offenders
convicted before the statute’s enactment. 159 The Court, in a plurality
opinion by Justice Kagan, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor, held
such delegation constitutional. 160 Justice Kagan cited to precedents
such as Mistretta 161 and Hampton, 162 and reiterated that the
Constitution allows Congress to delegate discretion as long as
Congress provides an intelligible principle to direct the actions of the
delegee. 163 She held that “Congress is on the need to give discretion
to executive officials to implement its programs[,]” 164 and therefore
argued that delegation is a constitutional necessity that the Court has
recognised for a long time. 165
Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion in which he agreed with
Justice Kagan that the post-1935 rejection of non-delegation
arguments directed the Court to reject this challenge but that he
would be open to reconsider this approach if there was a majority. 166
On the other side of the spectrum, Justice Gorsuch filed a thirtythree page dissent joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Thomas. His dissenting opinion is, as expected, full of originalist
verve. The reader gets the impression that Justice Gorsuch is
preparing the ground for a future overhaul of the non-delegation
doctrine when he appeals to the intent of the framers to confer
sovereignty to the people and insists that delegation of legislative
power to the executive frustrates “the system of government ordained
159. 34 U.S.C. § 20913(d). (“The Attorney General shall have the authority to specify the
applicability of the requirements of this subchapter to sex offenders convicted before
the enactment of this chapter . . . and to prescribe rules for the registration of any such
sex offenders and for other categories of sex offenders who are unable to comply with
subsection (b).”).
160. See Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2121.
161. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
162. J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
163. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2129 (citing J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co., 276 U.S. at 409).
164. Id. at 2130.
165. Id. (“Consider again this Court’s long-time recognition: ‘Congress simply cannot do
its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives.’” (quoting
Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372)).
166. Id. at 2131 (Alito, J., concurring) (“If a majority of this Court were willing to
reconsider the approach we have taken for the past 84 years, I would support that
effort. But because a majority is not willing to do that, it would be freakish to single
out the provision at issue here for special treatment.”).
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by the Constitution.” 167 He cites to passages of “The Federalist”168
and to the work of John Locke 169 to remind the Court of its obligation
to uphold the doctrine of separation of powers and “to prevent
Congress from ‘confer[ring] the Government's “judicial Power” on
entities outside Article III.’” 170 His dissent is based on the 1930’s
findings of Shechter Poultry and Panama (the only Supreme Court
decisions that uphold the non-delegation doctrine) that he uses as
examples of impermissible delegations:
Our precedents confirm these conclusions. If allowing the
President to draft a “cod[e] of fair competition” for
slaughterhouses was “delegation running riot,” then it’s hard
to see how giving the nation’s chief prosecutor the power to
write a criminal code rife with his own policy choices might
be permissible. And if Congress may not give the President
the discretion to ban or allow the interstate transportation of
petroleum, then it's hard to see how Congress may give the
Attorney General the discretion to apply or not apply any or
all of SORNA’s requirements to pre-Act offenders, and then
change his mind at any time. 171
His specific argument is that the delegation of power to specify the
applicability of the registration requirement constitutes the delegation
of unfettered discretion to decide which requirements to impose on
which pre-Act offenders and therefore to determine offenders’ rights,
something that the executive cannot do. 172
Justice Kavanaugh took no part in the consideration or decision of
Gundy because he was not a member of the court when the case was
argued in October 2018. 173 However, doubts remain as to what the
167. Id. at 2133 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“The framers understood, too, that it would
frustrate ‘the system of government ordained by the Constitution’ if Congress could
merely announce vague aspirations and then assign others the responsibility of
adopting legislation to realize its goals. Through the Constitution, after all, the people
had vested the power to prescribe rules limiting their liberties in Congress alone. No
one, not even Congress, had the right to alter that arrangement.”).
168. Id. at 2135 (citations omitted) (“The framers warned us against permitting
consequences like these. As Madison explained, ‘[t]here can be no liberty where the
legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or body of
magistrates.’”).
169. See id. at 2133.
170. Id. at 2142.
171. Id. at 2144.
172. See id. at 2143.
173. Kathryn E. Kovacs, Did the Dissent in Gundy v. United States Open Up a Can of
CONST.
SOC’Y
(June
24,
2019),
Worms?,
AM .
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decision would have been if Kavanaugh had been part of the court
and whether the non-delegation doctrine could stand a future
challenge in this conservative-leaning court. 174 Mila Sohoni,
commenting on the case on ScotusBlog, rightly contended that “the
significance of Gundy lies not in what the Supreme Court did today,
but in what the dissent and the concurrence portend for tomorrow.” 175
CONCLUSION: A TALE OF TRANSFORMATION?
The question of whether courts should defer interpretation of
ambiguous provisions to agencies is often regarded as a technical
question. In reality, far from being only a technicality, judicial
deference has deep political meaning and implications. 176 This is true
especially since polarization in Congress has made governing by
executive power the norm and federal agencies have acquired
increasing power. 177
This Article has explored the theoretical link between the doctrine
of judicial deference and the dormant doctrine of delegation, as
developed by the courts after the New Deal revolution. 178 It
highlighted that the jurisprudence around deference and the nondelegation doctrine is transforming and that the Court could curb
discretion of administrative agencies and, more widely, the use of
legislative delegations which will be of much use during the Biden
presidency. 179
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PM),
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